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The Great Depression, the New Deal, and the Current Crisis
Alexander J. Field
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Santa Clara, CA 95053
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In recent years one of the most salient philosophical divides between those on the right
and those on the left has involved the putative ability of government to improve our lives.
Ronald Reagan became famous for reiterating the adage that the most feared words in the
English language were, “We’re from the government and we’re here to help.” The
consequences of putting a political party that frequently disparaged government in charge
of providing essential government services became clear, however, in the Federal
government’s response to Hurricane Katrina. While the micropolitics may have seemed
like a win for ideologically driven Republicans - provision of shoddy government
services could reinforce the claim that only the private sector could provide decent
services, the philosophy eventually turned a cropper at the polls, and has been decisively
rejected. It is clear that the American public wants well thought out government
programs and policies, competently executed.
Whereas the political economic landscape has changed dramatically in recent months, the
gut level response of many with conservative inclinations to blame the government has
not. We are now in the midst of what will likely be the most serious economic and
financial crisis since the Great Depression. How did we get into this mess, what
responsibility does government bear in allowing this to happen, and what does the history
of the Great Depression tell us about how we should go forward?
In the presence of an unusual decline in consumption spending as households come off a
debt-fueled binge, a collapse of private sector investment spending, much of which until
recently was for residential housing, and export weakness due to worldwide recession,
the federal government is the only entity now that can step in to fill the gap in aggregate
demand. For these reasons, the 2009 stimulus plan is basically well motivated, although
probably too small. The current administration has not however, put forward a fully
persuasive plan to deal with the financial/banking/insurance crisis. Ben Bernanke, Larry
Summers and Timothy Geithner all seem to believe that what we have here is a classic
liquidity problem, that the large banks only look insolvent because wealth holders
irrationally don’t what to buy securitized debt obligations at much more than twenty to
thirty cents on the dollar. I have heard several times from colleagues who share the
Bernanke/Summers view that ultimately these financial assets, if held to maturity, will
yield sixty to seventy cents on the dollar.

That outcome seems to me unlikely, although the probability depends in part on what
policy initiatives are pursued. The reality is that the ratio of housing prices to income
soared to unsustainable levels, and prices in many parts of the country are unlikely to
return to pre-crash levels for a very long time. Without the prospect of that happening,
it’s hard to see how collateralized mortgage obligations can come anywhere near to
yielding what they were expected to.
That means that banks like Citibank, Bank or America and probably others are insolvent.
Ben Bernanke denied this in his March 2009 60 Minutes interview. But it is a time
honored tradition for debtors hounded by creditors to complain that if one only gave them
a little more time, their investments would turn out to have been sound. Sometimes the
argument has merit. In this case I think it does not. Vikram Pandit is no George Bailey,
this is not Bedford Falls, and Citigroup is not Bailey Building and Loan. Nor is the
solution to our problems to prettify bank balance sheets by relaxing mark to market (“fair
value”) accounting rules. These rules already included a number of procedures and
exceptions for dealing with assets which trade infrequently.
In 1991, in the aftermath of the Savings and Loan debacle, to which the ill advised 1982
Garn-St. Germain legislation contributed, Congress passed FDICIA, which requires that
the FDIC take prompt corrective action to deal with failing banks. In the late 1980s
insolvent savings and loans continued to borrow by issuing insured CDs and then did the
equivalent of putting everything on black in Las Vegas and figuring it was the
government’s problem if it came up red. It often did come up red, with the consequence
that the S and L balance sheets were in even worse shape when the government finally
stepped in than they had been earlier. The objective of prompt corrective action is to
protect taxpayers by forcing banks to stop making risky loans if their capital ratios fall
below a certain level, and to require the government (in the agency of the FDIC) to take
them over promptly if their balance sheets continue to deteriorate.
Risky lending by impaired institutions is not our problem today. Banks are not making
riskier and riskier loans to try and gamble themselves out of a hole. Indeed they are
criticized now not for lending too much but for lending too little. But the ultimate
concern that prompted FDICIA remains, which is that if we do not step in now and clean
up zombie banks taxpayers will end up on the hook for more.
Ultimately, the lesson of the 1930s is that capitalist financial institutions require a
government regulatory structure to forestall the probability of crises which threaten the
entire economic system. There is no question that we need a new, comprehensive
regulatory apparatus to deal with not just commercial banks but the entire shadow
banking system. The challenges we face today represent in part a failure of government,
in the sense that government did not maintain adequate regulatory machinery. That
indictment needs to be tempered, however, by the observation that it was private sector
innovations such as collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps, and private
sector behavior, that lie at the heart of the bonfire we are currently experiencing.
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The bailout of AIG is in fact a bailout of counterparties who were able to create, market
and hold mortgage backed securities under the belief that risk was adequately hedged
through inexpensive “insurance” contracts sold by AIG. Because these contracts were
not technically insurance, they were not regulated by state authorities and AIG was not
required to hold adequate reserves against them. Now taxpayers are making good on
them.
Retrospectively, one of the most egregious regulatory mistakes was not heeding
Brooksley Born’s 1998 call to require credit default swaps to be traded and cleared as are
futures contracts on a centralized exchange rather then in an entirely unregulated over the
counter market. Born, then head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, was
essentially shouted down by Alan Greenspan, Arthur Levitt, Robert Rubin, and Larry
Summers. Their victory over Born was consolidated in December 2000 legislation which
explicitly prohibited regulation by any government entity of credit default swaps. The
rationales given by these individuals (in Greenspan’s case it was largely ideological) do
not stand up well in the light of history, and Ben Bernanke as well as Tim Geithner are
now effectively advocating a somewhat weaker version of Born’s original proposal.
George Soros wants to go even further, restricting such “insurance” contracts to those
who actually hold the underlying asset. Right now you can do the equivalent not only of
insuring your own home against burning down, but taking out a policy on everybody
else’s house in the neighborhood as well.
A second set of mistakes were the 2004 decisions by the Securities and Exchange
Commission under Christopher Cox to remove controls that limited leverage of
investment banks to the 10 to 11 range – roughly what was historically true for
commercial banks. This regulatory relaxation allowed what were then the five large
investment banks to enter a “Consolidated Supervised Entity” program allowing them to
escape the traditional debt to equity limitation, and substituting for it an “alternative net
capital rule.” The consequence was that leverage in these firms soared to 33 to 35 to 1,
with disastrous results, once house prices ceased to appreciate at the same rate.
But to say that these sorry episodes show that government is the source of all of our
problems is like blaming President Bush for 9/ll. It is true that he and his staff failed to
heed explicit warnings about an imminent attack, but surely we should not let
Mohammed Atta and his crew off the hook. The financial and economic distress we find
ourselves in today reflects the operation of human proclivities whose consequences have
been evident in a history of speculative bubbles and crashes that stretches back hundreds
of years.
Although the banking/financial situation remains a mess, President Obama deserves
credit for pushing through a stimulus plan which, although too small, is certainly far
superior to inaction or Republican calls for a spending freeze. This view is of course not
universally shared across the political spectrum. Over much of the discussion of the need
for or likely success of the stimulus package looms the shadow of the 1930s. Indeed a
running battle is taking place in the pages of the Wall Street Journal and elsewhere
regarding the historical legacy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the New Deal. In the
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context of this discussion, a number of misconceptions and frankly silly claims have been
made, by economists and non-economists.
First, did New Deal spending get us out of the Depression in the sense of restoring us to
full employment? Of course not – that’s been the consensus of economists and economic
historians for over half a century – going all the way back to E. Cary Brown’s famous
1956 article. The increase in government spending was simply too small to compensate
for the collapse of private sector autonomous spending in the 1930s. Autonomous
spending is spending not closely linked to or induced by current receipts of income, and
includes investment spending -- purchases of plant and equipment including residential
housing -- as well as big ticket consumer items such as cars, furniture, and large
appliances. Both types of spending plummeted between 1929 and 1933.
Although they did not restore us to full employment until the war, New Deal fiscal
policies nevertheless operated in the right direction through Roosevelt’s first term. Both
real output and employment grew very strongly between 1933 and 1937, with
unemployment falling more than ten percentage points. The expansion reversed itself in
1938 because of tightened fiscal policy (a modest reduction in government spending and
the institution of a new payroll tax to finance the social security system) as well as
tightened monetary policy (the Fed pushed interest rates up because it was concerned that
the rising quantities of unborrowed reserves held by banks for precautionary reasons
presaged inflation). These moves toward tight money and fiscal “responsibility” drove
the unemployment rate up almost five percentage points, to 19 percent.
Lee Ohanian has been arguing that the New Deal kept the economy from recovering
through such policies as the National Industrial Recovery Act and the National Labor
Relations Act. For several reasons, these arguments are unpersuasive. First, although the
NIRA undoubtedly introduced some distortions at the microeconomic level, at the macro
level it played a role, in conjunction with monetary and fiscal policies, including the
abandonment of gold, in arresting deflation. In any event, the NIRA was gone by 1935.
As far as the NLRA, high unionization did not pose an obstacle to prosperity during the
golden age (1948-73), and an examination of data show that it is unlikely it did so in the
1930s. A simple look at GDP data confirms this.
The latest methodology for calculating real GDP uses the chained index method. The
problem in comparing the magnitude of output or its components at different times is that
prices change, and calculations of growth vary depending on whether one uses current
prices or prices of a previous year. This is the famous index number problem, a staple of
first year economics courses. The solution now adopted by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis is, for each year, to calculate the change in GDP using last years’ prices and
then again using this year’s prices, and then take a geometric average of the two (multiply
the two together and take the square root of the product).
The old way of doing this was to choose a given base year, calculate changes using base
period prices, and then periodically change the base year, which resulted in revisions of
what one thought to have been established as the historical record. The current
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procedures eliminate this problem, but at the cost of producing estimates for GDP
components that do not necessarily sum to GDP. The chained index method is good for
looking at the growth of real magnitudes over time, of interest here, but if one wants to
see how GDP breaks down into its different components in a given year, current dollar
numbers are better.
That said, what do the latest calculations of GDP and its major components,
consumption, investment, and government spending show
(http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Popular=Y , Table 1.1.6)? They
show that real GDP, which (in chained 2000 dollars) had fallen from $865.3 billion in
1929 to $635.5 billion in 1933, had risen to $911 billion in 1937. In other words, GDP
had completely recovered from its collapse during the Hoover administration and by
1937 was, in real terms, more than 5 percent above its 1929 peak. Gross Private Domestic
Investment, which plummeted disastrously from $91.3 in 1929 to $11.5 in 1932, had
come within a hair’s breadth of reattaining 1929 levels in 1937 ($91.1 billion). Both real
consumption and real GDP surpassed 1929 levels in 1936.
To be sure, unemployment was still far too high in 1936 and 1937, the result of growth in
the labor force, very strong productivity advance, which contributed to something of a
“jobless recovery”, and the failure of investment in residential housing to recover. The
latter was in part the consequence of poor land planning policies of the 1920s and the
wreckage of the real estate/residential construction boom that had peaked in 1926.
Real government spending, which remained at roughly the same level in 1930-33 (about
10 percent above 1929 levels) accelerated under Roosevelt, particularly after 1935. The
idea that the multipliers associated with such spending were less than 1 or possibly even
0 has been advanced by a number of economists, in particular Robert Barro. Barro
(2009) makes this claim based on what happened during the Second World War. But we
had already reached potential output by 1942. No serious Keynesian ever argued that
there would be a real spending multiplier if one started at potential. The argument had to
do with being inside the production possibility frontier, with slack labor and capital that
could be sucked into production if the government primed the pump with spending.
Parenthetically, the argument that tax cuts are preferable as stimulus ignores the fact that
in a heavily indebted economy, most tax cuts will simply be used to reduce debt, rather
than increase spending on goods and services, which is what we need now. It is
regrettable that we have reached this point (in 2009) after a long orgy of both private and
governmental consumption. It would have been better, now that we need to run large
deficits, if President Bush had foregone some of his tax cuts and military initiatives, and
left us with a smaller government debt. But these are the cards we’ve been dealt; the past
can’t be changed.
On the aggregate supply front, the argument, repeated over and over again, that tax cuts
benefit aggregate supply by reducing disincentives to work focuses exclusively on the
substitution effect, with no mention of possible income effects. As a result of the recent
crisis most academics have had their salaries frozen and also taken a big hit on their

5

pension accumulations. The salary freeze is equivalent in its effects on after tax income
to a tax increase. I know not a single academic who, as a consequence of the economic
crisis, plans to retire earlier. The facts are that within the ranges we’re discussing,
reductions in take home pay can as easily increase desired labor supply as reduce it.
In thinking about the stimulus provided by government spending, it is critical that we
distinguish between effects on aggregate demand and effects on aggregate supply. For
the former, it makes no difference whether the spending is of long term value to the
economy. Keynes is famous for suggesting that in a deep recession it would pay to
divide the unemployed into Team A and Team B, pay Team A to dig holes and Team B
to fill them in. Useless pork barrel projects such as bridges to nowhere and wasteful
military spending add nothing of permanent value to the economy, but if the economy is
severely depressed, it is better to have such spending than not.
Ideally, of course, stimulus spending would consist of government investment that
produces something of value. On this account, Depression era spending, some started
under Hoover, continued and ramped up under Roosevelt, measures up pretty well.
Government infrastructure projects contributed in important ways to the largely
unheralded expansion of potential output between 1929 and 1941. That expansion
underlay the successful prosecution of the Second World War and laid the foundation for
the age of high mass consumption that followed. My studies indicate that the build out of
the surface road network contributed to the very high rate of total factor productivity
(TFP) and labor productivity growth across the Depression years, generating private
sector spillovers in both transportation, where it facilitated a growing complementarity
between rail and trucking, and in wholesale and retail distribution.
Combined with TFP growth within manufacturing that was world class by any standard
of comparison other than the 1920s, one ended up with TFP growth between 1929 and
1941 for the private nonfarm economy (about 75 percent of the aggregate; agriculture and
government are excluded) of 2.31 percent per year without a cyclical adjustment or 2.78
percent per year with one. No other comparable period, including the golden age (194873), or the IT period (1995-2005), approaches this.
Virtually all of the growth in private sector output, as well as output per hour during the
Depression years is attributable to TFP advance. In part this reflected the maturing of a
private sector research and development system, before its trajectory was distorted by the
Manhattan project and postwar military spending. The number of scientists and
engineers in manufacturing R and D almost tripled in the United States between 1933 and
1940, and one sees similar trends in National Research Council data charting the
establishment of R and D labs or spending.
It’s true that TFP growth in manufacturing was higher in the 1920s (but not in the private
nonfarm economy as a whole, because not much was happening outside of
manufacturing). The 1920s record in manufacturing was largely the result of
transitioning from internal power distribution using overhead metal shafts with leather
belts bringing power to each machine’s drive shaft to distribution based on electricity
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flowing through wires to small electric motors. This was, however, a one time shift,
which produce a large boost to TFP levels in the sector but could not be expected to
generate a permanent acceleration in TFP growth.
The other main contributor to the Depression era growth in potential output in the
absence of growth in hours or private sector physical capital was Roosevelt’s public
spending. The rise in real wages for those employed across the Depression years was
certainly consistent with Roosevelt’s efforts to facilitate the growth of unions. But high
TFP growth would have had to have been reflected in some combination of growth in
real wages and the return to capital. Both wages and earnings, which bottomed out in
1932, went up dramatically under Roosevelt. In particular, recipients of capital income,
who had, with the exception of holders of fixed income securities, done terribly under
Hoover, did far better in the New Deal. Both proprietors’ income and corporate earnings
recovered very strongly between 1933 and 1937. The Dow Jones Industrial Average
advanced from a nadir of 43 in 1932 to 187.70 in 1937, although it fell by almost half in
the 1938 recession.
Finally, in ways that are sometimes not fully recognized, Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal
laid the foundation for postwar prosperity. Banking and financial legislation, such as the
Securities Act and the Securities and Exchange Act, provided a basis for several decades
of financial stability. Whereas its short run macroeconomic effects were contractionary,
Social Security established a basis for dealing with the problem of old age security.
Innovations in the layout and design of residential housing developments pioneered,
along with amortized mortgages, by the FHA, combined with street and highway
construction to create preconditions for the postwar housing boom, allowing serious
construction in this sector to resume after more than a two decade hiatus. Hydropower,
flood control, and rural electrification projects provided benefits to many parts of the
country. In addition to highways, bridges, and tunnels, the country was dotted with
libraries, municipal airports, and improvements in national parks which have been of
lasting benefit to citizens. Roosevelt’s New Deal spending was indeed too small to
restore the economy to full employment prior to the War. But, on the aggregate supply
side, it contributed to the extraordinary expansion of potential output that took place
between 1929 and 1941.
The country today is navigating perilous waters. President Obama’s administration, as
was Roosevelt’s, is called socialist or worse by some on the right. The problem, if
anything, however, is that key economic advisors, in particular Larry Summers and Tim
Geithner, have been too deferential towards Wall Street, have seemed too accepting of
the idea that what is good for Goldman Sachs is also good for the country. They need
help in finding the right path, not hopes that they will fail. And in studying history for
lessons about the future, we need to be clear eyed. Slipping into New Deal denialism, as
some have called it, will no more help the progress of economic science or the practice of
economic policy than will endorsing creationism facilitate advance in evolutionary
biology.
Alexander J. Field
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